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Abstract— In this work, message authentication over noisy
channels is studied. The model developed in this paper is the
authentication theory counterpart of Wyner’s wiretap channel
model. Two types of opponent attacks, namely impersonation
attacks and substitution attacks, are investigated for both single
message and multiple message authentication scenarios. For each
scenario, information theoretic lower and upper bounds on the
opponent’s success probability are derived. Remarkably, in both
scenarios, lower and upper bounds are shown to match, and
hence the fundamental limit of message authentication over
noisy channels is fully characterized. The opponent’s success
probability is further shown to be smaller than that derived in the
classic authentication model in which the channel is assumed to
be noiseless. These results rely on a proposed novel authentication
scheme in which key information is used to provide simultaneous
protection again both types of attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two fundamental primitives for any security
systems: 1) secure transmission, to ensure that the message
is received only by the legitimate receiver; 2) authentication,
to ensure that the received message truly comes from the
acclaimed transmitter.
Secure transmission has been investigated under two dif-
ferent models. In the model developed by Shannon [1],
transmissions are assumed to be noiseless; and the source
and intended destination use a common secret key K to
encrypt and decrypt the message M . Transmission is said
to be perfectly secure, if the signal received at the opponent
does not provide it with any information about M . Shannon
proved that one needs H(K) ≥ H(M) to achieve perfect
security. Taking transmission noise into consideration, Wyner
developed the wiretap channel [2], in which the transmitter
exploits the two different noise processes at the receiver and
opponent to transmit information securely. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[3] generalized this model and characterized the capacity
of the Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) with security
constraints.
Authentication theory with a noiseless transmission model,
which is shown in Figure 1, was developed by Simmons [4].
In this model, the source S and the receiver R share a secret
key K , which is used to identify the transmitter. When the
transmitter intends to send message M , it transmits W =
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Fig. 1. The authentication channel.
f(K,M) over a noiseless public channel, where f is the
encoding function at the source. On receiving Wˆ , which
might be different from W due to various attacks from the
opponent O, the receiver needs to judge whether the message
comes from the legitimate transmitter or not. If the receiver
accepts the message (i.e., the receiver believes that the signal
is authentic), the receiver then gets an estimate of the source
message M ; otherwise, it rejects the message. The opponent
gets a perfect copy of W and can perform the following
two types of attacks. The first one is called an impersonation
attack, in which the opponent sends W ′ to the destination
before the source sends anything. This attack is successful if
W
′ is accepted by the receiver as authentic. We denote the
success probability of this attack by PI . The second attack is
called a substitution attack, in which after receiving W , the
opponent modifies it to W ′ and sends it to the destination. The
attack is successful if the receiver accepts W ′ and decodes this
into another source state. We denote the success probability
of this attack by PS . Obviously, the opponent will choose the
attack that has higher success probability. Hence the success
probability PD of the opponent (i.e., the cheating probability)
is PD = max{PI , PS}.
Lower bounds on PI and PS have been developed in [4]
and recovered by Maurer [5] from a hypothesis testing point
of view. In particular, it was shown that PI ≥ 2−I(K;W ) and
PS ≥ 2
−H(K|W )
. One can easily identify a tradeoff between
PI and PS . To minimize the probability of a successful imper-
sonation attack, the transmitted ciphertext, from the legitimate
source, must contain a sufficient amount of information about
the secret key in order to convince the legitimate receiver
that the transmitted message comes from the source. That
is I(K;W ) should be large, which unfortunately decreases
H(K|W ). Hence, the attacker can take advantage of the
leaked information over its noiseless channel (contained in
W ) to increase the probability of a successful substitution
attack. In fact, the strategy that minimizes the lower bound
on PD = max{PI , PS} is to use half of the key information
to protect against the impersonation attack and the other half of
the key information to protect against the substitution attack,
which gives PD ≥ 2−H(K)/2. These bounds are of a negative
nature, since they only give lower bounds for the cheating
probability. There is no upper-bound available in the literature,
partly due to the fact that usual bounding techniques such
as Jensen’s inequality and the log-sum inequality are not
applicable here. We will elaborate on this point in the sequel.
Simmons’s model was developed under a noiseless trans-
mission model. However, since physical transmission systems
are noisy, common practice is to use channel coding to convert
the noisy channel into a noiseless one, and then to design
an authentication code on top of the channel coding. Liu
and Boncelet [6], [7] also considered the situation in which
the channel coding is not perfect, and hence there are some
residual errors induced by the channel. The conclusion of these
papers is that channel noise is detrimental to authentication,
since it will cause the receiver to reject authentic messages
from the transmitter.
In this paper, we take an alternative view of the transmission
noise and design the channel coding and authentication scheme
jointly. We show that by doing so, one can exploit the noise
to lower the cheating probability of the opponent. More
specifically, we derive both a lower bound and an upper-bound
on the cheating probabilities of authentication schemes over
noisy channels. We show that these two bounds coincide, and
are smaller than the lower-bound on the cheating probability
when the channel is assumed to be noiseless. In particular,
we show that PD = 2−H(K), thus all the key information
can be used to protect against the substitution attack and
the impersonation attack simultaneously. We also study the
authentication of multiple messages using the same key K ,
and show that all the key information can be used to protect
against all the attacks simultaneously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the model. In Section III, we discuss the single
message authentication scenario. We then analyze the authen-
tication of multiple message using a same key in Section IV.
Finally, in Section V, we offer some conclusions.
II. MODEL
Throughout this paper, upper-case letters (e.g., X) denote
random variables, lower-case letters (e.g., x) denote realiza-
tions of the corresponding random variables, and calligraphic
letters (e.g, X ) denote finite alphabet sets over which cor-
responding variables range. Also, upper-case boldface letters
(e.g., X) denote random vectors and lower-case boldface let-
ters (e.g., x) denote realizations of the corresponding random
vectors.
Figure 2 shows the model under consideration. The model
differs from Simmons’s model only in that the transmission
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Fig. 2. The authentication channel.
channel is noisy. More specifically, we consider the DMC and
assume that when the transmitter sends x, the receiver receives
y with probability
PnY |X(y|x) =
n∏
j=1
P (y|x)
and the opponent receives z with probability
PnZ|X(z|x) =
n∏
j=1
P (z|x).
Here P (y|x) and P (z|x) denote the channel transition prob-
abilities, while x, y and z range through finite sets X , Y and
Z , respectively. In order to derive more general bounds, we
assume that the channel between the opponent and receiver is
noiseless, and that the opponent can send anything over this
channel. Note that this assumption does not incur any loss of
generality, and actually gives the opponent advantages, since
any noisy channel can be simulated by this noiseless channel
by simply randomizing the transmitted signal.
To identify the transmitter, we assume that the source and
the destination have a common secret key K ranging from a
set K having |K| possible values. To transmit the message M ,
the source uses a stochastic encoding function f to convert the
message and key into a length n vector X, i.e., X = f(K,M).
Upon receiving Y, which may come from either the source
or the opponent, the destination uses a decoding function g to
judge whether the message is authentic or not. If the signal is
deemed authentic, then the destination recovers the message
Mˆ = g(Y,K); otherwise the destination sets φ = g(Y,K).
We require the condition that, if the signal is authentic, the
decoding error probability at the destination must approach
zero as the length of the code increases, i.e., for any ǫ > 0,
there is a positive integer n0, such that when n ≥ n0, we have
Pe = Pr{g(Y,K) 6= M |Y comes from X} ≤ ǫ.
The error probability Pe consists of two parts: P1 and P2,
where P1 is the probability of a miss, which is the probability
that the receiver wrongly rejects an authentic message, and P2
is the probability that the decoder correctly accepts the signal
as being authentic but incorrectly decodes it.
The opponent is assumed to be aware of the system design,
except for the particular realizations k and m of the key K
and message M . We consider both of the two forms of attack
described above. That is, we consider the impersonation attack,
in which the opponent sends codeword X to the receiver before
the transmitter sends anything. Such an attack is successful if
X is accepted as authentic by the receiver, and we denote
this probability of success as PI as noted above. We also
consider the substitution attack, in which the opponent blocks
the transmission of the main channel while receiving Z. After
that, the opponent modifies the signal and transmits it to the
receiver. This attack is considered to be successful if the
modified signal is accepted as authentic by the receiver and is
decoded into m′ that is not equal to the original message m.
Again, the success probability of this attack is denoted by PS .
III. AUTHENTICATION OF A SINGLE MESSAGE
A. The Wiretap Channel
We begin by reviewing some results related to the wiretap
channel introduced in [2]. The wiretap channel is defined by
two DMCs X → (Y,Z), where X is the input alphabet
from the transmitter, Y is the output alphabet at the legitimate
receiver and Z is the output alphabet at the wiretapper. In
the wiretap channel, the wiretapper is assumed to be passive,
and the goal is to transmit information to the destination
while preventing information leakage to the wiretapper. More
specifically, to send a message M ∈ M, the transmitter sends
X = f(M), where f is a stochastic encoder. After receiving
Y, the destination obtains an estimate Mˆ = g(Y). A perfectly
secure rate Rs is said to be achievable if there exist f and g,
such that for reach ǫ > 0, there is a positive integer n0, such
that ∀n > n0
|M| ≥ 2nRs (1)
Pr{Mˆ 6= M} ≤ ǫ, and (2)
1
n
I(M ;Z) ≤ ǫ. (3)
The perfect secrecy capacity Cs is defined to be the supre-
mum of the set of Rs values that satisfy the conditions (1)
- (3). It is proved in [3] that the perfect secrecy capacity is
given by
Cs = max
U→X→Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)],
where U is an auxiliary random variable satisfying the Markov
chain relationship U → X → Y Z .
The source-wiretapper channel is said to be less noisy than
the main channel, if for all possible U that satisfy the above
Markov chain relationship, one has I(U ;Z) > I(U ;Y ). We
can see that the perfect secrecy capacity is nonzero unless the
wiretapper channel is less noisy than the main channel.
B. Authentication Scheme
We use the wiretap channel to perform authentication. More
specifically, if the wiretapper channel is not less noisy than the
main channel, there exists an input distribution PX such that
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) > 0. For a given key size |K|, there exists
a positive integer n0, such that ∀n ≥ n0,
exp{n(I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z))} > |K|.
In our transmission scheme, we separate the transmission
of information and key. The source first sends the message M
using a code for the wiretap channel, and then sends the key
K using the same code book. After receiving these signals,
the destination obtains an estimate Mˆ of the message and a
separate estimate Kˆ of the key. If Kˆ = K , the receiver accepts
the message to be authentic; otherwise it rejects the message.
For an impersonation attack, the optimal strategy for the
opponent is to choose the key that has the largest probability
of being accepted by the receiver, i.e.,
PI = max
k′∈K
{∑
k∈K
P (k)γ(k, k
′
)
}
,
where γ(k, k′) is an indicator function that equals 1 if k′
is accepted as authentic, and equals 0 in other cases. In our
scheme, γ(k, k′) = 1 if k′ = k; otherwise γ(k, k′) = 0.
For a substitution attack, the optimal strategy for the oppo-
nent is to choose m′ and k′ such that the probability of the
message being accepted by the receiver and being decoded
into m′ 6= m, is maximized, i.e.,
PS =
∑
z1,z2
P (z1, z2)
max
m′∈M,k′∈K


∑
m,k
P (m, k|z1, z2)γ(m, k,m
′
, k
′
)


=
∑
z1,z2
P (z1)P (z2)
max
m′∈M,k′∈K


∑
m,k
P (m|z1)P (k|z2)γ(m,m
′
)γ(k, k
′
)

 ,
where z1 is the signal received for the message part and z2 is
the signal received for the key part. Here γ(m, k,m′ , k′) = 1
if m′ 6= m and k′ = k, and equals 0 otherwise. The second
equality in the above expression is due to the fact that M
and K are independent, and thus that Z1 and Z2 are also
independent.
To simplify the analysis, we first upper-bound PS as follows
PS =
∑
z1,z2
P (z1)P (z2)
max
m′∈M,k′∈K


∑
m,k
P (m|z1)P (k|z2)γ(m,m
′
)γ(k, k
′
)


(a)
≤
∑
z1,z2
P (z1)P (z2) max
m∈M,k∈K
{P (m|z1)P (k|z2)}
(b)
≤
∑
z1
P (z1)
(∑
z2
P (z2)max
k∈K
{P (k|z2)}
)
=
∑
z2
P (z2)max
k∈K
{P (k|z2)} . (4)
In this expression, inequality (a) follows by assuming that
γ(m,m
′
) = 1 and γ(k, , k′) = 1 for m′ = arg max
m∈M
P (m|z1)
and k′ = argmax
k∈K
P (k|z2). If this is not the case, the
summation will only be smaller, since γ(x, y) is the indicator
function. Inequality (b) follows from the fact that P (m|z1) ≤
1.
In the sequel, we will use this upper-bound, and hence we
can ignore the message transmission part z1. Consequently,
we write z2 as z for the sake of simplicity of notation.
After receiving Z, the opponent gains an amount I(K;Z)
of information about the key, and thus can use this information
to choose k that maximizes P (k|z2). From (3), we have that
I(K;Z) ≤ nǫ. (5)
The inequality in (5) is not enough to analyze (4) for the
following two reasons. First, though ǫ is small, nǫ can go to
infinity as n grows, and hence the opponent may eventually
gain a sufficient amount of information about the key. This
point has been pointed out in [8]–[10]. The second reason is
that there is a maximization in the summand in (4), which
means that we need to consider the worst case scenario,
whereas I(K;Z) is an average quantity. Actually, this fact is
exploited in [4], [5] to derive the lower bounds by replacing
this maximization with an averaging, which readily gives us
a lower bound and is more amenable to analysis.
In this paper, we borrow techniques from [10], [11] to
analyze this term.
C. Bounds
We begin with some definitions. Let C be a codebook for
the wiretap channel, and let P˜ (x, z) be the joint distribution
on C ×Zn. We denote by Q(z) the marginal distribution of z
when the input distribution is limited to C, and by P (x|z) =
P˜ (x, z)/Q(z) the conditional distribution of x given z.
Let {C1, · · · , CN} be a partition of C, and denote this
partition as a mapping, i.e., f : C → {C1, · · · , CN}. Also
denote by Qj the conditional distribution of z when the input
distribution is uniform on Cj , i.e.,
Qj(z) =
∑
x∈Cj
P˜ (x, z)/P (Cj).
Define dav(f) =
N∑
j=1
P (Cj)d(Qj , Q), with
d(Qj , Q) =
∑
z∈Zn
∣∣∣Qj(z)−Q(z)∣∣∣.
Here d(Qj , Q) is the L1 distance between the two distributions
Qj and Q. When d(Qj , Q) is zero, the opponent cannot
distinguish between the uniform input distributions on Cj and
C by observing only the channel output.
Intuitively, if there exists a set C and a corresponding
partition f such that dav(f) is arbitrarily small, the receiver
gains no information about the subset Cj from which the
transmitted codeword x comes, given the channel output z.
We can rewrite dav(f) as follows
dav(f) =
N∑
j=1
∑
z∈Zn
∣∣∣P (Cj)Qj(z) − P (Cj)Q(z)∣∣∣
=
∑
z∈Zn
Q(z)d(z),
with
d(z) =
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣P (Cj |z)− P (Cj)∣∣∣.
Here d(z) is the L1 distance between uniform distribution
and conditional distribution of the key after observing z at the
opponent.
We need the following lemma from [10].
Lemma 1 ( [10]): Consider a wiretap channel X →
(Y,Z), and choose δ > 0. Suppose TP ⊂ Xn is a type class
with P (x) bounded away from 0, and such that I(X ;Y ) >
I(X ;Z) + 2δ. Then, there exist a codebook C with size
|C| = exp{n(I(X ;Y ) − δ)}, drawn from TP , and equal-size
disjoint subsets C1, · · · , CN of C with
N ≤ exp{n(I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− 2δ)},
such that C =
N⋃
i=1
Ci is the codeword with exponentially small
average probability of error for the main channel X → Y .
Moreover, the partition function f : C → {1, · · · , N} of
C with f−1(i) = Ci, i = 1, · · · , N has exponentially small
dav(f) for the distribution P˜C defined on C × Zn by
P˜C(x, z) =
1
|C|
P (z|x),x ∈ C, z ∈ Zn.
Proof: Please see [10].
Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 1: If the source-wiretapper channel is not less
noisy than the main channel, then PI = PS = 2−H(K), and
hence, PD = 2−H(K).
Proof: (Sketch) For the lower-bound, the opponent can
guess the value of the key. If the guess is correct, the opponent
can invoke any attack and the attack will be successful. The
probability that the opponent guesses the value of key correctly
is 2−H(K). This provides a lower bound. We outline the
proof of a tight upper-bound in the following. If the source-
wiretapper channel is not less noisy than the main channel,
there exists an input distribution such that the secrecy rate
is larger than zero. We generate a codebook for the wiretap
channel according to this input distribution and transmit the
message and key separately using this codebook. To bound the
success probability of the substitution attack, we first bound
the ’max’ sign in (4) with d(z). We then link dav(f) to the
mutual information leaked to the opponent. Using the fact
that the mutual information leakage in the wiretap channel
can be arbitrarily small if the secrecy capacity is nonzero,
we obtain an upper-bound for the success probability of the
substitution attack that is arbitrarily close to 2−H(K). The
optimal strategy for the impersonation attack of the opponent
is to guess the value of the key, hence the success probability
of the impersonation attack is bounded by 2−H(K).
IV. AUTHENTICATION OF MULTIPLE MESSAGES
In this section, we consider the situation in which the same
key K is used to authenticate a sequence of J messages. We
use the same scheme as for the single message case. That is,
we send the message and the key separately for each packet
using a code for the wiretap channel. Let PI,i be the success
probability of the impersonation attack after the opponent has
observed i−1 transmissions, i.e., the opponent sends codeword
Xi to cheat the destination after observing Z1, · · · ,Zi−1. This
attack is successful if Xi is accepted as authentic by the
destination. The optimal attack strategy of the opponent is to
choose to send the key k′ with the largest success probability;
that is
PI,i =
∑
z1,··· ,zi−1
P (z1, · · · , zi−1)
max
k′∈K
{∑
k∈K
P (k|z1, · · · , zi−1)γ(k, k
′
)
}
≤
∑
z1,··· ,zi−1
P (z1, · · · , zi−1)
max
k∈K
{P (k|z1, · · · , zi−1)}, (6)
where γ(k, k′) is the indicator function defined above.
The opponent can also choose to invoke a substitution attack
after receiving the ith transmission, i.e., it changes the content
of the ith package and sends it to the destination. The attack
is successful if the modified message is accepted as authentic
and the destination decodes it into an incorrect source state.
On denoting the success probability of this attack to be PS,i,
we have
PS,i =
∑
zi,0,z1,··· ,zi
P (zi,0, z1, · · · , zi)
max
m′∈M,k′∈K


∑
m,k
P (m, k|zi,0, z1, · · · , zi)γ(m, k,m
′
, k
′
)

 ,
where zi,0 is the message part of the ith packet. Following the
same steps as those in (4), we can bound PS,i as
PS,i ≤
∑
z1,··· ,zi
P (z1, · · · , zi)max
k∈K
{P (k|z1, · · · , zi)} . (7)
Note that (6) and (7) have similar forms. Hence, we can derive
tight bounds for only one of these attacks. The result for the
other attack follows similarly.
Obviously, the opponent will choose the attack that maxi-
mizes its cheating probability PD . Bounds for PI,i and PS,i
under the noiseless transmission model were derived in [5],
which shows that
PD = max{PI,1, · · · , PI,J , PS,1, · · · , PS,J} ≥ 2
−H(K)/(J+1).
This implies that after several rounds of authentication, the
opponent obtains almost all the information about the key and
hence can choose an attack having a high success probability.
On the other hand, in the noisy channel model, we show
that one can limit the information leaked to the opponent, and
thus the success probability of the opponent will not increase
even by observing more packets.
Theorem 2: For any finite J , PI,i = PS,i = 2−H(K), i ∈
{1, · · · , J}. Hence, PD = 2−H(K).
Proof: (Sketch) For the lower-bound, the opponent can
guess the value of the key. If the guess is correct, the opponent
can invoke any attack and the attack will be successful. The
probability that the opponent guesses the value of key correctly
is 2−H(K). This provides a lower bound. For a tight upper-
bound, we first upper bound the key information leaked to
the opponent. We then follow the similar steps as those of
the single message authentication case and obtain an upper-
bound of the success probability of the substitution attack that
is arbitrarily close to 2−H(K). Similarly, we obtain an upper-
bound for the impersonation attack that is arbitrarily close to
2−H(K).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of message
authentication in the presence of channel noise. We have
derived information theoretic lower and upper bounds for the
success probability of an opponent’s impersonation attack and
substitution attack in single and multiple message authentica-
tion scenarios. We have further shown that the lower and upper
bound match, and thus have completely characterized these
probabilities. We have further shown that, compared with the
classical authentication model in which channel is assumed
to be noiseless, the opponent’s success probability is largely
reduced. We thus have established the utility of channel noise
in message authentication applications.
Exploiting other characteristics of channels, such as channel
fading, to facilitate message authentication is an interesting
avenue for further research. Also of interest is the develop-
ment of authentication theory for the scenario in which the
source and destination possess correlated, but not identical,
sequences, which has obvious practical implications.
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